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Abstract
In the field of privacy preserving data publishing, many privacy definitions have been proposed.
Privacy definitions are like contracts that guide the behavior of an algorithm that takes in sensitive data
and outputs non-sensitive sanitized data. In most cases, it is not clear what these privacy definitions
actually guarantee.
In this paper, we propose the first (to the best of our knowledge) general framework for extracting
semantic guarantees from privacy definitions. These guarantees are expressed as bounds on the change
in beliefs of Bayesian attackers.
In our framework, we first restate a privacy definition in the language of set theory and then extract
from it a geometric object called the row cone. Intuitively, the row cone captures all the ways an attacker’s
prior beliefs can be turned into posterior beliefs after observing an output of an algorithm satisfying that
privacy definition. The row cone is a convex set and therefore has an associated set of linear inequalities.
Semantic guarantees are generated by interpreting these inequalities as probabilistic statements.
Our framework can be applied to privacy definitions or to individual algorithms to identify the types
of inferences they prevent. In this paper we use our framework to analyze the semantic privacy guarantees
provided by randomized response, FRAPP, and several algorithms that add integer-valued noise to their
inputs.
1 Introduction
The ultimate goal of statistical privacy is to produce statistically useful sanitized data from sensitive datasets.
It has two main research thrusts: developing/analyzing privacy definitions for protecting sensitive datasets,
and designing algorithms that satisfy a given privacy definition while producing useful outputs. The algo-
rithm design problem is well-posed and is the focus of most of the research activity. By contrast, privacy is
a very subtle topic for which formalizing concepts is extremely challenging.
Analysis of privacy is important when organizations prepare to release data. When choosing a privacy
definition (which subsequently guides the design of an algorithm for producing sanitized data), an organiza-
tion is interested in questions such as the following. What classes of information does the privacy definition
protect? Does it offer protections that the organization is interested in? Does it offer additional protections
that are not necessary (meaning that the sanitized data will contain too much distortion)? What formal
protections are provided by intuitive approaches to privacy that have been collected over the past 50 years
[40]?
In this paper we present the first (to the best of our knowledge) framework for extracting semantic
guarantees from privacy definitions and individual algorithms. That is, instead of answering narrow questions
such as “does privacy definition Y protect X?” the goal is to answer the more general question “what does
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privacy definition Y protect?” This lets an organization judge whether a privacy definition is too weak or
too strong for its needs.
The framework can be used to extract guarantees about changes in the beliefs of computationally un-
bounded Bayesian attackers. We apply our framework to several privacy definitions and algorithms for
which we derived previously unknown privacy semantics – these include randomized response [40], FRAPP
[1]/PRAM [20], and several algorithms that add integer-valued noise to their inputs. It turns out that their
Bayesian semantic guarantees are a consequence of their ability to protect various notions of parity of a
dataset. Since parity is frequently not a sensitive piece of information, we also show how privacy definitions
can be relaxed when they are too strong.
Currently our framework requires a certain level of mathematical skill from the user. Tools and method-
ologies for reducing this burden are part of our future plans. For example, the large class of privacy definitions
proposed by [28] are a direct consequence of this framework; they were specifically designed to bypass the
difficult parts of the framework.
The framework is based on a partial axiomatization of privacy [26, 25]. However, the only ideas we need
from [26, 25] are two axioms and a anecdote about 2 specific privacy definitions that do not satisfy the
privacy axioms1 but which imply other privacy definitions that do.
Given any privacy definition, the first step of the framework is to manipulate it using the two axioms to
obtain a related privacy definition that we call the consistent normal form (the axioms essentially remove
implicit assumptions in the original privacy definition). From the consistent normal form we extract an
object called the row cone which, intuitively, captures all the ways in which an attacker’s prior belief can
be turned into a posterior belief after observing an output of an algorithm that satisfies the given privacy
definition. Mathematically, the row cone is represented as a convex set and therefore has an associated
collection of linear inequalities. We extract semantic guarantees by re-interpreting the coefficients of the
linear inequalities as probabilities and re-interpreting the linear inequalities themselves as statements about
probabilities.
Our contributions are:
• A novel framework that introduces the concepts of consistent normal form and row cone and uses them
to extract semantic guarantees from privacy definitions.
• Several applications of our framework, from which we extract previously unknown semantic guarantees
for randomized response, FRAPP/PRAM, and several algorithms that add integer-valued noise to their
inputs (including the Skellam distribution [38] and a generalization of the geometric mechanism [19]) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a detailed overview of our approach in
Section 2. We discuss related work in Section 3. In Section 4, we review two privacy axioms from [26, 25]
and then we show how to use them to obtain the consistent normal form, which removes some implicit
assumptions from a privacy definition. Using the consistent normal form, we formally define the row cone
(a fundamental geometric object we use for extracting semantic guarantees) in Section 4.2. In Section 5,
we then apply our framework to extract new semantic guarantees for randomized response (Section 5.1),
FRAPP/PRAM (Section 5.2), and noise addition algorithms (Section 5.3). We discuss relaxations of privacy
definitions in Section 5.4 and present conclusions in Section 6.
2 The Bird’s-Eye View
We first present some basic concepts in Section 2.1 and then provide a high-level overview of our framework
in Section 2.2.
1For example, one axiom states that building a histogram from sanitized data and then releasing the histogram (instead of
the sanitized data) is acceptable. This idea is widely accepted by designers of privacy definitions, yet many privacy definitions
inadvertently fail to satisfy that axiom [26, 25].
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2.1 Basic Concepts
Let I = {D1, D2, . . . } be the set of all possible databases. We now explain the roles played by data curators,
attackers, and privacy definitions.
The Data Curator owns a dataset D ∈ I. This dataset contains information about individuals, business
secrets, etc., and therefore cannot be published as is. Thus the data curator will first choose a privacy
definition and then an algorithm M that satisfies this definition. The data curator will apply M to the data
D and will then release its output (i.e. M(D)), which we refer to as the sanitized output. We assume that
the schema of D is public knowledge and that the data curator will disclose the privacy definition, release
all details of the algorithm M (except for the specific values of the random bits it used), and release the
sanitized output M(D).
The Attacker will use the information about the schema of D, the sanitized output M(D), and knowl-
edge of the algorithm M to make inferences about the sensitive information contained in D. In our model,
the attacker is computationally unbounded. The attacker may also have side information – in the literature
this is often expressed in terms of a prior distribution over possible datasets Di ∈ I. In this paper we are
mostly interested in guarantees against attackers who reason probabilistically and so we also assume that
an attacker’s side information is encapsulated in a prior distribution.
A Privacy Definition is often expressed as a set of algorithms that we trust (e.g., [40, 25]), or a set of
constraints on how an algorithm behaves (e.g., [12]), or on the type of output it produces (e.g., [36]). Note
that treating a privacy definition as a set of algorithms is the more general approach that unifies all of these
ideas [25] – if a set of constraints is specified, a privacy definition becomes the set of algorithms that satisfy
those constraints; if outputs in a certain form (such as k-anonymous tables [36]) are required, a privacy
definition becomes the set of algorithms that produce those types of outputs, etc. The reason that a privacy
definition should be viewed as a set of algorithms is that it allows us to manipulate privacy definitions using
set theory.
Formally, a privacy definition is the set of algorithms with the same input domain that are trusted to
produce nonsensitive outputs from sensitive inputs. We therefore use the notation Priv to refer to a privacy
definition and M ∈ Priv to mean that the algorithm M satisfies the privacy definition Priv.
The data curator will choose a privacy definition based on what it can guarantee about the privacy of
sensitive information. If a privacy definition offers too little protection (relative to the application at hand),
the data curator will avoid it because sensitive information may end up being disclosed, thereby causing
harm to the data curator. On the other hand, if a privacy definition offers too much protection, the resulting
sanitized data may not be useful for statistical analysis. Thus it is important for the data curator to know
exactly what a privacy definition guarantees.
The Goal is to determine what guarantees a privacy definition provides. In this paper, when we discuss
semantic guarantees, we are interested in the guarantees that always hold regardless of what sanitized output
is produced by an algorithm satisfying that privacy definition. We focus on computationally unbounded
Bayesian attackers and look for bounds on how much their beliefs change after seeing sanitized data. It is
important to note that the guarantees will depend on assumptions about the attacker’s prior distribution.
This is necessary, since it is well-known that without any assumptions, it is impossible to preserve privacy
while providing useful sanitized data [15, 27, 28].
2.2 Overview
In a nutshell, our approach is to represent deterministic and randomized algorithms as matrices (with possibly
infinitely many rows and columns) and to represent privacy definitions as sets of algorithms and hence as
sets of matrices. If our goal is to analyze only a single algorithm, we simply treat it as a privacy definition
(set) containing just one algorithm. The steps of our framework then require us to normalize the privacy
definitions to remove some implicit assumptions (we call the result the consistent normal form), extract
the set of all rows that appear in the resulting matrices (we call this the row cone), find linear inequalities
describing those rows, reinterpret the coefficients of the linear inequalities as probabilities, and reinterpret
the inequalities themselves as statements about probabilities to get semantic guarantees. In this section, we
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
D1 D2 . . .
ω1 P (M(D1) = ω1) P (M(D2) = ω1) . . .
ω2 P (M(D1) = ω2) P (M(D2) = ω2) . . .
ω3 P (M(D1) = ω3) P (M(D2) = ω3) . . .
...
...
...
...

Figure 1: The matrix representation of M. Columns are indexed by datasets ∈ domain(M) and rows are
indexed by outputs ∈ range(M).
describe these steps in more detail and defer a technical exposition of the consistent normal form and row
cone to Section 4.
2.2.1 Algorithms as matrices.
Since our approach relies heavily on linear algebra, it is convenient to represent algorithms as matrices.
Every algorithm M, randomized or deterministic, that runs on a digital computer can be viewed as a matrix
in the following way. An algorithm has an input domain I = {D1, D2, . . . } consisting of datasets Di, and
a range {ω1, ω2, . . . }. The input domain I and range(M) are necessarily countable because each Di ∈ I
and ωj ∈ range(M) must be encoded as finite bit strings. The probability P (M(Di) = ωj) is well defined
for both randomized and deterministic algorithms. The matrix representation of an algorithm is defined as
follows (see also Figure 1).
Definition 2.1 (Matrix representation of M). Let M be a deterministic or randomized algorithm with
domain I = {D1, D2, . . . } and range {ω1, ω2, . . . }. The matrix representation of M is a (potentially infinite)
matrix whose columns are indexed by I and rows are indexed by range(M). The value of each entry (i, j) is
the quantity P (M(Dj) = ωi).
2.2.2 Consistent Normal Form of Privacy Definitions.
Recall from Section 2.1 that we take the unifying view that a privacy definition is a set of algorithms (i.e.,
the set of algorithms that satisfy certain constraints or produce certain types of outputs).
Not surprisingly, there are many sets of algorithms that do not meet common expectations of what a
privacy definition is [25]. For example, suppose that we decide to trust an algorithm M to generate sanitized
outputs from the sensitive input data D. Suppose we know that a researcher wants to run algorithm A on
the sanitized data to build a histogram. If we are willing to release the sanitized output M(D) publicly,
then we should also be willing to release A(M(D)). That is, if we trust M then we should also trust A◦M
(the composition of the two algorithms). In other words, if M ∈ Priv, for some privacy definition Priv, then
A◦M should also be in Priv.
Many privacy definitions in the literature do not meet criteria such as this [25]. That is, M may explicitly
satisfy a given privacy definition but A◦M may not. However, since the output of M is made public and
anyone can run A on it, these privacy definitions come with the implicit assumption that the composite
algorithm A◦M should be trusted.
Thus, given a privacy definition Priv, we first must expand it to include all of the algorithms we should
trust (via a new application of privacy axioms). The result of this expansion is called the consistent normal
form and is denoted by CNF(Priv). Intuitively, CNF(Priv) is the complete set of algorithms we should trust
if we accept the privacy definition Priv and the privacy axioms. We describe the consistent normal form in
full technical detail in Section 4.1.
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Figure 2: An example of a row cone (shaded) and its defining linear inequalities.
2.2.3 The Row Cone
Recall that we represent algorithms as matrices (Definition 2.1) and privacy definitions as sets of algorithms.
Therefore CNF(Priv) is really a set of matrices. The row cone of Priv, denoted by rowcone(Priv), is the
set of vectors of the form c~x where c ≥ 0 and ~x is a row of a matrix corresponding to some algorithm
M ∈ CNF(Priv).
How does the row cone capture the semantics of Priv? Suppose M ∈ CNF(Priv) is one of the algorithms
that we trust. Let D be the true input dataset and let ω = M(D) be the sanitized output that we publish.
A Bayesian attacker who sees output ω and is trying to derive sensitive information will need to compute
the posterior distribution P (data = Di | M(data) = ω) for all datasets Di. This posterior distribution is a
function of the attacker’s prior P (data = Di) and the vector of probabilities:
[P (M(D1) = ω), P (M(D2) = ω), . . . ]
This vector belongs to rowcone(Priv) because it corresponds to some row of the matrix representation of
M (i.e., the row associated with output ω). Note that multiplying this vector by any positive constant will
leave the attacker’s posterior beliefs unchanged. The row cone is essentially the set of all such probability
vectors that the attacker can ever see if we use a trusted algorithm (i.e. something belonging to CNF(Priv));
therefore it determines all the ways an attacker’s beliefs can change (from prior to posterior).
Thus constraints satisfied by the row cone are also constraints on how prior probabilities could be turned
into posterior probabilities. In Figure 2 we illustrate a row cone in 2 dimensions (i.e. the input domain
consists of only 2 datasets). Each vector in the row cone is represented as a point in 2-d space. Later in the
paper, it will turn out that the row cone is always a convex set and hence has an associated system of linear
inequalities (corresponding to the intersection of halfspaces containing the row cone) as shown in Figure 2.
2.2.4 Extracting Semantic Guarantees From the Row Cone
The row cone is a convex set (in fact, a convex cone) and so satisfies a set of linear inequalities having the
forms [4]:
A1P (M(D1) = ω) +A2P (M(D2) = ω) + . . . ≥ 0 or
A1P (M(D1) = ω) +A2P (M(D2) = ω) + . . . = 0 or
A1P (M(D1) = ω) +A2P (M(D2) = ω) + . . . > 0
that must hold for all trusted algorithms M ∈ CNF(Priv) and sanitized outputs ω ∈ range(M) they can
produce. The key insight is that we can re-interpret the magnitude of the coefficients |A1|, |A2|, . . . of these
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linear inequalities as probabilities (dividing by |A1|+ |A2|+ ... if necessary) and then re-interpret the linear
inequalities as statements about prior and posterior probabilities of an attacker. We give a detailed example
in Section 5.1, where we apply our framework to randomized response. The semantic guarantees we extract
then have the form: “if the attacker’s prior belongs to set X then here are restrictions on the posterior
probabilities the attacker can form” (note that avoiding any assumptions on prior probabilities/knowledge
is not possible if the goal is to release even marginally useful sanitized data [15, 27, 28]).
3 Related Work
3.1 Evaluating Privacy
Research in statistical privacy mainly focuses on developing privacy definitions and algorithms for publishing
sanitized data (i.e., nonsensitive information) derived from sensitive data. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper provides the first framework for extracting semantic guarantees from privacy definitions. Other
work on evaluating privacy definitions looks for the presence or absence of specific vulnerabilities in privacy
definitions or sanitized data.
In the official statistics community, re-identification experiments are performed to assess whether indi-
viduals can be identified from sanitized data records [6]. In many such experiments, software is used to link
sanitized data records to the original records [43]. Reiter [34] provides a detailed example of how to apply
the decision-theoretic framework of Duncan and Lambert [11] to measure disclosure risk. There are many
other methods for assessing privacy for the purposes of official statistics; for surveys, see [6, 41, 42].
Other work in statistical privacy seeks to identify and exploit specific types of weaknesses that may
be present in privacy definitions. Dwork and Naor [15] formally proved that it is not possible to publish
anonymized data that prevents an attacker from learning information about people who are not even part
of the data unless the anonymized data has very little utility or some assumptions are made about the
attacker’s background knowledge. Lambert [29] suggests that harm can occur even when an individual is
linked to the wrong anonymized record (as long as the attacker’s methods are plausible). Thus one of the
biggest themes in privacy is preventing an attacker from linking an individual to an “anonymized” record [9],
possibly using publicly available data [39] or other knowledge [32]. Dinur and Nissim [10] and later Dwork
et al. [14] showed fundamental limits to the amount of information that can be released even under very
weak privacy definitions (information-theoretically and computationally [16]). These attacks generally work
by removing noise that was added in the sanitization process [22, 21, 31]. Ganta et al. [18] demonstrated a
composition attack where independent anonymized data releases can be combined to breach privacy; thus a
desirable property of privacy definitions is to have privacy guarantees degrade gracefully in the presence of
multiple independent releases of sanitized data. The minimality attack [44] showed that privacy definitions
must account for attackers who know the algorithm used to generate sanitized data; otherwise the attackers
may reverse-engineer the algorithm to cause a privacy breach. The de Finetti attack [24] shows that privacy
definitions based on statistical models are susceptible to attackers who make inferences using different models
and use those inferences to undo the anonymization process; thus it is important to consider a wide range of
inference attacks. Also, one should consider the possibility that an attacker may be able to manipulate data
(e.g. by creating many new accounts in a social network) prior to its release to help break the subsequent
anonymization of the data [3]. Note also that privacy concerns can also be associated with aggregate
information such as trade secrets (and not just rows in a table) [7, 28].
3.2 Privacy Definitions
In this section, we review some privacy definitions that will be examined in this paper.
3.2.1 Syntactic Privacy Definitions
A large class of privacy definitions places restrictions on the format of the output of a randomized algorithm.
Such privacy definitions are known as syntactic privacy definitions. The prototypical syntactic privacy
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definition is k-anonymity [36, 39]. In the k-anonymity model, a data curator first designates a set of attributes
to be the quasi-identifier. An algorithm M then satisfies k-anonymity if its input is a table T and its output
is another table T ∗ that is k-anonymous – for every tuple in T ∗, there are k − 1 other tuples that have the
same value for the quasi-identifier attributes [36, 39]. Algorithms satisfying k-anonymity typically work by
generalizing (coarsening) attribute values. For example, if the data contains an attribute representing the age
of a patient, the algorithm could generalize this attribute into age ranges of size 10 (e.g., [0−9], [10−19], etc.)
or ranges of size 20, etc. Quasi-identifier attributes are repeatedly generalized until a table T ∗ satisfying k-
anonymity is produced. The rationale behind k-anonymity is that quasi-identifier attributes may be recorded
in publicly available datasets. Linking those datasets to the original table T may allow individual records to
be identified, but linking to the k-anonymous table T ∗ will not result in unique matches.
3.2.2 Randomized Response
Randomized response is a technique developed by Warner [40] to deal with privacy issues when answering
sensitive questions in a face-to-face survey. There are many variations of randomized response. One of the
most popular is the following: a respondent answers truthfully with probability p and lies with probability
(1 − p), thus ensuring that the interviewer is not certain about the respondent’s true answer. Thus the
scenario where we can apply randomized response is the following: the input table T contains 1 binary
attribute and k tuples. We can apply randomized response to T by applying the following procedure to
each tuple: flip the binary attribute with probability 1− p. The perturbed table, which we call T ∗, is then
released. Note that randomized response is a privacy definition that consists of exactly one algorithm: the
algorithm that flips each bit independently with probability 1−p. We use our framework to extract semantic
guarantees for randomized response in Section 5.1.
3.2.3 PRAM and FRAPP
PRAM [20] and FRAPP [1] are generalizations of randomized response to tables where tuples can have more
than one attribute and the attributes need not be binary. PRAM can be thought of as a set of algorithms
that independently perturb tuples, while FRAPP is an extension of PRAM that adds formally specified
privacy restrictions to these perturbations.
Let T UP be the domain of all tuples. Each algorithm MQ satisfying PRAM is associated with a transition
matrix Q of transition probabilities, where the entry Qb,a is the probability P (a → b) that the algorithm
changes a tuple with value a ∈ T UP to the value b ∈ T UP. Given a dataset D = {t1, . . . , tn}, the algorithm
MQ assigns a new value to the tuple t1 according to the transition probability matrix Q, then it independently
assigns a new value to the tuple t2, etc. It is important to note that the matrix representation of MQ (as
discussed in Section 2.2.1) is not the same as the transition matrix Q. As we will discuss in Section 5.2,
the relationship between the two is that the matrix representation of MQ is equal to
⊕
nQ, where
⊕
is the
Kronecker product.
FRAPP, with privacy parameter γ, imposes a restriction on these algorithms. This restriction, known
as γ-amplification [17], requires that the transition matrices Q satisfy the constraints
Qb,a
Qc,a
≤ γ for all
a, b, c ∈ T UP. This condition can also be phrased as P (b→a)P (c→a) ≤ γ.
3.2.4 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [12, 13] is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. A randomized algorithm M satisfies -differential privacy if for all pairs of databases T1, T2
that differ only in the value of one tuple and for all sets S, P (M(T1) ∈ S) ≤ eP (M(T2) ∈ S).
Differential privacy guarantees that the sanitized data that is output has little dependence on the value
of any individual’s tuple (for small values of ). It is known to be a weaker privacy definition than random-
ized response. Using our framework, we show in Section 5.1.1 that the difference between the two is that
randomized response provides additional protection for the parity of every subset of the data.
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4 Consistent Normal Form and the Row Cone
In this section, we formally define the consistent normal form CNF(Priv) and rowcone(Priv) of a privacy
definition Priv and derive some of their important properties. These properties will later be used in Section
5 to extract novel semantic guarantees for randomized response, FRAPP/PRAM, and for several algorithms
(including the geometric mechanism [19]) that add integer random noise to their inputs.
4.1 The Consistent Normal Form
Recall that we treat any privacy definition Priv as the set of algorithms with the same input domain. For
example, we view k-anonymity as the set of all algorithms that produce k-anonymous tables [36]. As noted
in [25], such a set can often have inconsistencies. For example, consider an algorithm M that first transforms
its input into a k-anonymous table and then builds a statistical model from the result and outputs the
parameters of that model. Technically, this algorithm M does not satisfy k-anonymity because “model
parameters” are not a “k-anonymous table.” However, it would be strange if the data curator decided that
releasing a k-anonymous table was acceptable but releasing a model built solely from that table (without
any side information) was not acceptable. The motivation for the consistent normal form is that it makes
sense to enlarge the set Priv by adding M into this set.
It turns out that privacy axioms can help us identify the algorithms that should be added. For this
purpose, we will use the following two axioms from [25].
Axiom 4.1 (Post-processing [25]). Let Priv be a privacy definition (set of algorithms). Let M ∈ Priv and
let A be any algorithm whose domain contains the range of M and whose random bits are independent of the
random bits of M. Then the composed algorithm A◦M (which first runs M and then runs A on the result)
should also belong to Priv.2
Note that Axiom 4.1 prevents algorithm A from using side information since its only input is M(D).
Axiom 4.2 (Convexity [25]). Let Priv be a privacy definition (set of algorithms). Let M1 ∈ Priv and
M2 ∈ Priv be two algorithms satisfying this privacy definition. Define the algorithm choicepM1,M2 to be the
algorithm that runs M1 with probability p and M2 with probability 1 − p. Then choicepM1,M2 should belong
to Priv.
The justification in [25] for the convexity axiom (Axiom 4.2) is the following. If both M1 and M2 belong
to Priv, then both are trusted to produce sanitized data from the input data. That is, the outputs of M1 and
M2 leave some amount of uncertainty about the input data. If the data curator randomly chooses between
M1 and M2, the sensitive input data is protected by two layers of uncertainty: the original uncertainty
added by either M1 or M2 and the uncertainty about which algorithm was used. Further discussion can be
found in [25].
Using these two axioms, we define the consistent normal form as follows:3
Definition 4.3. (CNF). Given a privacy definition Priv, its consistent normal form, denoted by CNF(Priv),
is the smallest set of algorithms that contains Priv and satisfies Axioms 4.1 and 4.2.
Essentially, the consistent normal form uses Axioms 4.1 and 4.2 to turn implicit assumptions about which
algorithms we trust into explicit statements – if we are prepared to trust any M ∈ Priv then by Axioms 4.1
and 4.2 we should also trust any M ∈ CNF(Priv). The set CNF(Priv) is also the largest set of algorithms
we should trust if we are prepared to accept Priv as a privacy definition.
The following theorem provides a useful characterization of CNF(Priv) that will help us analyze privacy
definitions in Section 5.
2Note that if M1 and M2 are algorithms with the same range and domain such that P (M1(Di) = ω) = P (M2(Di) = ω) for
all Di ∈ I and ω ∈ range(M1), then we consider M1 and M2 to be equivalent.
3Note that this is a more general and useful idea than the observation in [25] that 2 specific variants of differential privacy
do not satisfy the axioms but do imply a third variant that does satisfy the axioms.
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Theorem 4.4. Given a privacy definition Priv, its consistent normal form CNF(Priv) is equivalent to the
following.
1. Define Priv(1) to be the set of all (deterministic and randomized algorithms) of the form A◦M, where
M ∈ Priv, range(M) ⊆ domain(A), and the random bits of A and M are independent of each other.
2. For any positive integer n, finite sequence M1, . . . ,Mn and probability vector ~p = (p1, . . . , pn), use
the notation choice~p(M1, . . . ,Mn) to represent the algorithm that runs Mi with probability pi. Define
Priv(2) to be the set of all algorithms of the form choice~p(M1, . . . ,Mn) where n is a positive integer,
M1, . . . ,Mn ∈ Priv(1), and ~p is a probability vector.
3. Set CNF(Priv) = Priv(2).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 4.5. If Priv = {M} consists of just one algorithm, CNF(Priv) is the set of all algorithms of the
form A◦M, where range(M) ⊆ domain(A) and the random bits in A and M are independent of each other.
Proof. See Appendix B.
4.2 The Row Cone
Having motivated the row cone in Section 2.2.3, we now formally define it and derive its basic properties.
Definition 4.6 (Row Cone). Let I = {D1, D2, . . . } be the set of possible input datasets and let Priv be a
privacy definition. The row cone of Priv, denoted by rowcone(Priv), is defined as the set of vectors:{(
c ∗ P [M(D1) = ω], c ∗ P [M(D2) = ω], . . .
)
: c ≥ 0, M ∈ CNF(Priv), ω ∈ range(M)
}
Recalling the matrix representation of algorithms (as discussed in Section 2.2.1 and Figure 1), we see that
a vector belongs to the row cone if and only if it is proportional to some row of the matrix representation of
some trusted algorithm M ∈ CNF(Priv).
Given a M ∈ CNF(Priv) and ω ∈ range(M), the attacker uses the vector (P [M(D1) = ω], P [M(D2) =
ω], . . . ) ∈ rowcone(Priv) to convert the prior distribution P (data = Di) to the posterior P (data = Di | M(data) =
ω). Scaling this likelihood vector by c > 0 does not change the posterior distribution, but it does make it
easier to work with the row cone.
Constraints satisfied by rowcone(Priv) are therefore constraints shared by all of the likelihood vectors
(P [M(D1) = ω], P [M(D2) = ω], . . . ) ∈ rowcone(Priv) and therefore they constrain the ways an attacker’s
beliefs can change no matter what trusted algorithm M ∈ CNF(Priv) is used and what sanitized output
ω ∈ range(M) is produced.
The row cone has an important geometric property:
Theorem 4.7. rowcone(Priv) is a convex cone.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The fact that the row cone is a convex cone means that it satisfies an associated set of linear constraints
(from which we derive semantic privacy guarantees). For technical reasons, the treatment of these constraints
differs slightly depending on whether the row cone is finite dimensional (which occurs if the number of possible
datasets is finite) or infinite dimensional (if the set of possible datasets is countably infinite). We discuss
this next.
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4.2.1 Finite dimensional row cones.
A closed convex set in finite dimensions is expressible as the solution set to a system of linear inequalities
[4]. When the row cone is closed then the linear inequalities have the form:
A1,1P [M(D1) = ω] + · · ·+A1,nP [M(Dn) = ω] ≥ 0
A2,1P [M(D1) = ω] + · · ·+A2,nP [M(Dn) = ω] ≥ 0
...
...
...
...
(with possibly some equalities of the form B1P [M(D1) = ω]+ · · ·+BnP [M(Dn) = ω] = 0 thrown in). When
the row cone is not closed, it is still well-approximated by such linear inequalities: their solution set contains
the row cone, and the row cone contains the solution set when the ’≥’ in the constraints is replaced with
’>’.
4.2.2 Infinite dimensional row cones.
When the domain of the data is countably infinite4, vectors in the row cone have infinite length since there
is one component for each possible dataset. The vectors in the row cone belong to the vector space `∞, the
set of vectors whose components are bounded. Linear constraints in this vector space can have the form:
A1P [M(D1) = ω] +A2P [M(D2) = ω] + · · · ≥ 0 (1)
(where
∑
i
|Ai| <∞)
but, if one accepts the Axiom of Choice, linear constraints are much more complicated and are generally
defined via finitely additive measures [37]. On the other hand, in constructive mathematics5, such more
complicated linear constraints cannot be proven to exist ([37], Sections 14.77, 23.10, and 27.45, and [30]).
Therefore we only consider the types of linear constraints shown in Equation 1.
4.2.3 Interpretation of linear constraints.
Starting with a linear inequality of the form A1P (M(D1) = ω)+A2P (M(D2) = ω)+· · · ≥ 0, we can separate
out the positive coefficients, say Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , from the negative coefficients, say Ai′1 , Ai′2 , . . . , to rewrite it in
the form:
Ai1P (M(Di1) = ω) +Ai2P (M(Di2) = ω) + · · · ≥ |Aj′1 | P (M(Di′1) = ω) + |Ai′2 | P (M(Di′2) = ω) + . . .
where all of the coefficients are now positive. We can view each Aij as a possible value for the prior
probability P (data = Dij ) (or a value proportional to a prior probability). Setting S1 = {Di1 , Di2 , . . . } and
S2 = {Di′1 , Di′2 , . . . }. This allows us to interpret the linear constraints as statements such as αP (data ∈
S1,M(data) = ω) ≥ P (data ∈ S2,M(data) = ω). Further algebraic manipulations (and a use of constants
independent of M) result in statements such as:
α ≥ P (data ∈ S2 | M(data) = ω)
P (data ∈ S1 | M(data) = ω) (2)
α′ ≥ P (data ∈ S2 | M(data) = ω)
P (data ∈ S1 | M(data) = ω)
/P (data ∈ S2)
P (data ∈ S1) (3)
Equation 2 means that if an attacker uses a certain class of prior distributions then after seeing the sanitized
data, the probability of some set S2 is no more than α times the probability of some set S1. Equation 3
4We need not consider uncountably infinite domains since digital computers can only process finite bit strings, of which
there are countably many.
5More precisely, mathematics based on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus the Axiom of Dependent Choice [37]
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means that if an attacker uses a certain class of priors, then the relative odds of S2 vs. S1 can increase by
at most α′ after seeing the sanitized data6.
Of particular importance are the sets S1 and S2 of possible input datasets, whose relative probabilities
are constrained by the privacy definition. In an ideal world they would correspond to something we are
trying to protect (for example, S1 could be the set of databases in which Bob has cancer and S2 could be
the set of databases in which Bob is healthy). If a privacy definition is not properly designed, S1 and S2
could correspond to concepts that may not need protection for certain applications (for example, S1 could
be the set of databases with even parity and S2 could be the set of databases with odd parity). In any case,
it is important to examine existing privacy definitions and even specific algorithms to see which sets they
end up protecting.
5 Applications
In this section, we present the main technical contributions of this paper – applications of our framework for
the extraction of novel semantic guarantees provided by randomized response, FRAPP/PRAM, and several
algorithms (including a generalization of the geometric mechanism [19]) that add integer-valued noise to
their inputs. We show randomized response and FRAPP offer particularly strong protections on different
notions of parity of the input data. Since such protections are often unnecessary, we show, in Section 5.4,
how to manipulate the row cone to relax privacy definitions.
We will make use of the following theorem which shows how to derive CNF(Priv) and rowcone(Priv) for
a large class of privacy definitions that are based on a single algorithm.
Theorem 5.1. Let I be a finite or countably infinite set of possible datasets. Let M∗ be an algorithm with
domain(M∗) = I. Let M∗ be the matrix representation of M∗ (Definition 2.1). If (M∗)−1 exists and the L1
norm of each column of (M∗)−1 is bounded by a constant C then
(1) A bounded row vector ~x ∈ rowcone({M∗}) if and only if ~x ·m ≥ 0 for every column m of (M∗)−1.
(2) An algorithm M, with matrix representation M , belongs to CNF({M∗}) if and only if the matrix
M(M∗)−1 contains no negative entries.
(3) An algorithm M, with matrix representation M , belongs to CNF({M∗}) if and only if every row of M
belongs to rowcone({M∗}).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Note that one of our applications, namely the study of FRAPP/PRAM, does not satisfy the hypothesis
of this theorem as it is not based on a single algorithm. Nevertheless, this theorem still turns out to be
useful for analyzing FRAPP/PRAM.
5.1 Randomized Response
In this section, we apply our framework to extract Bayesian semantic guarantees provided by randomized
response. Recall that randomized response applies to tables with k tuples and a single binary attribute.
Thus each database can be represented as a bit string of length k. We formally define the domain of datasets
and the randomized response algorithm as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Domain of randomized reponse). Let the input domain I = {D1, . . . , D2k} be the set of
all bit strings of length k. The bit strings are ordered in reverse lexicographic order. Thus D1 is the string
whose bits are all 1 and D2k is the string whose bits are all 0.
6In fact, that idea has led to the creation of a large class of privacy definitions [28] as a followup to this framework; the
linear constraints that characterize privacy definitions in [28] are precisely the constraints of what we here call the row cone,
hence all the difficult parts of the framework have been bypassed in [28].
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Definition 5.3 (Randomized response algorithm). Given a privacy parameter p ∈ [0, 1], let Mrr(p) be the
algorithm that, on input D ∈ I, independently flips each bit of D with probability 1− p.
For example, when k = 2 then | I | = 4 and the matrix representation of Mrr(p) is

D1 = 11 D2 = 10 D3 = 01 D4 = 00
ω1 = 11 p
2 p(1− p) p(1− p) (1− p)2
ω2 = 10 p(1− p) p2 (1− p)2 p(1− p)
ω3 = 01 p(1− p) (1− p)2 p2 p(1− p)
ω4 = 00 (1− p)2 p(1− p) p(1− p) p2

Note that randomized response, as a privacy definition, is equal to {Mrr(p)}. The next lemma says that
without loss of generality, we may assume that p > 1/2.
Lemma 5.4. Given a privacy parameter p, define q = max(p, 1− p). Then
• CNF({Mrr(p)}) = CNF({Mrr(q)}).
• If p = 1/2 then CNF({Mrr(p)}) consists of the set of algorithms whose outputs are statistically indepen-
dent of their inputs (i.e. those algorithms M where P [M(Di) = ω] = P [M(Dj) = ω] for all Di, Dj ∈ I
and ω ∈ range(M)), and therefore attackers learn nothing from those outputs.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Therefore, in the remainder of this section, we assume p > 1/2 without loss of generality. Now we derive
the consistent normal form and row cone of randomized response.
Theorem 5.5 (CNF and rowcone). Given input space I = {D1, . . . , D2k} of bit strings of length k and a
privacy parameter p > 1/2,
• A vector ~x = (x1, . . . , x2k) ∈ rowcone({Mrr(p)}) if and only if for every bit string s of length k,
2k∑
i=1
pham(s,Di)(p− 1)k−ham(s,Di)xi ≥ 0
where ham(s,Di) is Hamming distance between s and Di.
• An algorithm M with matrix representation M belongs to CNF({Mrr(p)}) if and only if every row of M
belongs to rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
Proof. See Appendix F.
We illustrate this theorem with our running example of tables with k = 2 tuples.
Example 5.6. (CNF of randomized response, k = 2). Let p > 1/2. With 2 tuples and one binary attribute,
the domain I = {11, 10, 01, 00}. An algorithm M with matrix representation M belongs to the CNF of
randomized response (with privacy parameter p) if for every vector ~x = (x11, x10, x01, x00) that is a row of
M , the following four constraints hold:
p2x00 + (1− p)2x11 ≥ p(1− p)x01 + p(1− p)x10 (4)
(1− p)2x00 + p2x11 ≥ p(1− p)x01 + p(1− p)x10 (5)
p2x01 + (1− p)2x10 ≥ p(1− p)x00 + p(1− p)x11 (6)
(1− p)2x01 + p2x10 ≥ p(1− p)x00 + p(1− p)x11 (7)
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We use Example 5.6 to explain the intuition behind the process of extracting Bayesian semantic guarantees
from the row cone of randomized response, as given by the constraints in Equations 4, 5, 6, and 7. Let us
consider the following three attackers.
Attacker 1. This attacker has the prior beliefs that P (data = 11) = p2, P (data = 00) = (1 − p)2 and
P (data = 01) = P (data = 10) = p(1 − p), so that each bit is independent and equals 1 with probability p
(this p is the same as the privacy parameter p in randomized response). Let us consider the effect of the
constraint in Equation 4 on the attacker’s inference. This constraint says that for all M in the CNF of
randomized response and for all ω ∈ range(M),
p2P [M(11) = ω] + (1− p)2P [M(00) = ω] ≥ p(1− p)P [M(01) = ω] + p(1− p)P [M(10) = ω] (8)
Note that the coefficients in the linear constraints have the same values as the prior probabilities of the
possible input datasets. Substituting those prior beliefs into Equation 8, we get the constraint that for all
ω ∈ range(M):
P (data = 11)P [M(11) = ω] + P (data = 00)P [M(00) = ω] ≥ P (data = 01)P [M(01) = ω] + P (data = 10)P [M(10) = ω]
which in turn is equal to the constraint on the attacker’s belief about the joint distribution of the input and
output of M:
P [parity(data) = 0 ∧M(data) = ω] ≥ P [parity(data) = 1 ∧M(data) = ω]
Dividing both sides by P (M(data) = ω) (where data is a random variable), we get the following constraints
that M imposes on the attacker’s posterior distribution:
P [parity(data) = 0 | M(data) = ω] ≥ P [parity(data) = 1 | M(data) = ω]
Thus M guarantees that if an attacker believes that bits in the database are generated independently with
probability p, then after seeing the sanitized output, the attacker will believe that the true input is more
likely to have even parity. Also, note that the attacker’s prior belief about even parity (which is p2+(1−p)2)
is greater than the attacker’s prior belief about odd parity (which is 2p(1 − p)). Therefore M guarantees
that the attacker will not change his mind about which parity, even or odd, is more likely.
Attacker 2. Now consider a different attacker who believes that the first bit in the true database is 1 with
probability 1−p and the second bit is 1 with probability p (both bits are still independent). Then, by similar
calculations, Equation 6, implies that for this attacker
P [parity(data) = 1 | M(data) = ω] ≥ P [parity(data) = 0 | M(data) = ω]
Thus, after seeing any sanitized output, the attacker will believe that the true input was more likely to have
odd parity than even parity. This attacker’s prior belief about odd parity (which is p2 + (1− p)2) is greater
than this attacker’s prior belief about even parity (which is 2p(1 − p)). Thus again, any M in the CNF of
randomized response will ensure that the attacker will not change his mind about the which parity is more
likely.
Attacker 3. This attacker believes that the first bit is 1 with probability 1/2 and believes the second bit
is 1 with probability p (the bits are independent of each other). In this case, the attacker’s prior beliefs are
that odd parity and even parity are equally likely. It is easy to see that now the output of M can make
the attacker change his mind about which parity is more likely (for example, consider what happens when
Mrr(p) outputs 01 or 00). This is true because the attacker was so unsure about parity that even the slightest
amount of evidence can change his beliefs about which parity is (slightly) more likely. However, the attacker
will not change his mind about the parity of the second bit, for which he has greater confidence. This result
is a consequence of Theorem 5.7 below, which formally presents the semantic guarantees of randomized
response.
The difference between Attacker 3 and Attackers 1, 2 is that Attacker 3 expressed the weakest prior
preference between even and odd parity (i.e. 1/2 vs. 1/2). Attackers 1 and 2 had stronger prior beliefs
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about which parity is more likely and as a result randomized response guarantees that they will not change
their minds about which parity is more likely.
The following theorem generalizes these observations to show that randomized response protects the
parity of any set of bits whose prior probabilities are ≥ p or ≤ 1 − p (where p is the privacy parameter).
It also shows that the only algorithms that have this property are the ones that belong to the trusted set
CNF({Mrr(p)}). Also note that, by Theorem 5.5, an algorithm M with matrix representation M belongs
to CNF({Mrr(p)}) if and only if every row of M belongs to rowcone({Mrr(p)}). Thus the following theorem
completely characterizes the privacy guarantees provided by randomized response.7
Theorem 5.7. Let p be a privacy parameter and let I = D1, . . . , D2k . Let M be an algorithm that has
a matrix representation whose every row belongs to the row cone of randomized response. If the attacker
believes that the bits in the data are independent and bit i is equal to 1 with probability qi, then M protects
the parity of any subset of bits that have prior probability ≥ p or ≤ 1−p. That is, for any subset {`1, . . . , `m}
of bits of the input data such that q`j ≥ p ∨ q`j ≤ 1− p for j = 1, . . . ,m, the following holds:
• If P (parity(J) = 0) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1) then P (parity(J) = 0 | M(data)) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1 | M(data))
• If P (parity(J) = 1) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0) then P (parity(J) = 1 | M(data)) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0 | M(data))
Furthermore, an algorithm M can only provide these guarantees if every row of its matrix representation
belongs to rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
Proof. See Appendix G.
In many cases, protecting the parity of an entire dataset is not necessary in privacy preserving applications
(in fact, some people find it odd).8 Using the row cone, it is possible to relax a privacy definition to get rid
of such unnecessary protections. We discuss this idea in Section 5.4.
5.1.1 The relationship between randomized response and differential privacy.
When setting  = log p1−p then it is well known that randomized response satisfies -differential privacy.
Also, for this parameter setting, differential privacy provides the same protection as randomized response
for any given bit in the dataset – a bit corresponds to the record of one individual and differential privacy
would allow a bit’s value to be retained with probability at most e/(1 + e) = p (and therefore flipped
with probability 1− p). However, Theorem 5.7 shows that randomized response goes beyond the protection
afforded by differential privacy by requiring stronger protection of the parity of larger sets of bits as well.
Note that Kasiviswanathan et al. [23] proved a learning-theoretic separation result between randomized
response and differential privacy which roughly states that randomized response cannot be used to efficiently
learn a problem called MASKED-PARITY. That concept of parity involves solving a linear system of equa-
tions in a d-dimensional vector space over the integers modulo 2. While very different from the notion of
parity that we study, one direction of future work is to determine if our result about the semantic guarantees
of randomized response can lead to a new proof of the result by Kasiviswanathan et al. [23].
5.2 FRAPP and PRAM
In some cases, it may be difficult to derive the row cone of a privacy definition Priv. In these cases, it helps to
have some notion of an approximation to a row cone from which semantic guarantees can still be extracted.
One might wonder whether the Hausdorff distance [2] or some other measure of distance between sets might
be a meaningful measure of the quality of an approximation. Unfortunately it is not at all clear what such
a distance measure means in terms of semantic guarantees; finding a meaningful quantitative measure is an
interesting open problem.
7All other guarantees are a consequence of them.
8In this setting, we are normally interested only in the parity of individual bits since each bit corresponds to the value of
one individual’s record.
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Thus we take the following approach. If we cannot derive rowcone(Priv), our goal becomes to find a
strictly larger convex cone r′ that contains rowcone(Priv). The reason is that any linear inequality satisfied
by r′ is also satisfied by rowcone(Priv); the semantic interpretation of the linear inequality is then a guarantee
provided by Priv. Thus the approximation may lose some semantics but never generates incorrect
semantics. This idea leads to the following definition.
Definition 5.8 (Approximation cone). Given a privacy definition Priv, an approximation cone of Priv is
a closed convex cone r′ such that rowcone(Priv) ⊆ r′.
In this section, we apply this approximation idea to FRAPP [1], which is a privacy definition based on
the perturbation technique PRAM [20]. Recall from Section 3.2.3 that the types of algorithms considered by
FRAPP are algorithm MQ that have a transition matrix Q where the (a, b) entry, denoted by PQ(b → a),
is the probability that a tuple with value b gets changed to a. The algorithm MQ modifies each tuple
independently using this transition matrix.
Definition 5.9 (Domain of FRAPP). Define T UP = {a1, a2, . . . , aN} to be the domain of tuples. Choose
an arbitrary ordering for these values. Define the data domain to be I = {D1, D2, . . . } where each Di is a
sequence of k tuples from T UP and the list D1, D2, . . . is in lexicographic order.
Definition 5.10 (γ-FRAPP [1]). Given a privacy parameter γ ≥ 1, γ-FRAPP is the privacy definition
containing all algorithms MQ that use transition matrices Q with the γ-amplification property [17]: for all
tuple values a, b, c ∈ T UP, PQ(b→a)PQ(c→a) ≤ γ.
We now construct an approximation cone for γ-FRAPP. If MQ is an algorithm in γ-FRAPP with
transition matrix Q, then it is easy to see that the matrix representation of MQ, denoted by MQ, is:
MQ =
k⊗
i=1
Q
(where k is the number of tuples in databases from I and
⊗
is the Kronecker product).
Let ej be the column vector of length N that has a 1 in position j and 0 in all other positions. Write
p = γ1+γ (so that γ =
p
1−p ). The constraints imposed on Q by γ-FRAPP can then be written as:
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} : Q(pei − (1− p)ej)  ~0
where~0 is the vector containing only 0 components and ~a  ~bmeans that ~a−~b has no negative components.
Therefore every vector ~x that is the row vector of MQ, the matrix representation of MQ, must satisfy the
constraints:
∀i1, . . . , ik, j1, . . . , jk ∈ {1, . . . , N} : MQ
(
k⊗
`=1
(pei` − (1− p)ej`)
)
 ~0 (9)
Using these constraints we can define the Kronecker approximation cone for FRAPP.
Definition 5.11. (Kronecker approximation cone K˜p). Given a privacy parameter γ, let p =
γ
γ+1 . Define
the Kronecker approximation cone, denoted by K˜p to be the set of vectors ~x that satisfy the linear constraints
in Equation 9 (where ej` is the j
th
` column vector of the N ×N identity matrix).
Lemma 5.12. Let p = γγ+1 . Then K˜p is an approximation cone for γ-FRAPP.
Proof. See Appendix H.
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The connection between the approximation cone K˜p of FRAPP and rowcone(Mrr(p)), the row cone of
randomized response, is clear once we rephrase the linear constraints that define rowcone(Mrr(p)) in Theorem
5.5 as follows:
~x ∈ rowcone(Mrr(p))⇔ ∀ i1, . . . , ik, j1, . . . , jk ∈ {1, 2} : ~x ·
(
k⊗
`=1
(pe′i` − (1− p)e′j`)
)
≥ 0
where ej` is the j
th
` column vector of the 2× 2 identity matrix.
Thus we can use Theorem 5.7, which gave a semantic interpretation for randomized response to derive
some of the semantic guarantees provided by FRAPP.
These guarantees are as follows. Suppose Bob is an attacker who satisfies the following conditions.
• Bob believes that the tuples in the true dataset are independent,
• Bob has ruled out all but two values for the tuple of each individual. That is, for each i, Bob knows that
the value of tuple ti is either some value ai ∈ T UP or bi ∈ T UP.
• For each tuple ti, Bob believes that ti = ai with probability qi and ti = bi with probability 1− qi.
then for any subset J of the tuples such that ti ∈ J only if qi ≥ p = γ1+γ , then if Bob believes P (parity(J) =
1) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0) then after seeing output ω, Bob believes P (parity(J) = 1 | ω) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0 | ω),
and if Bob believes P (parity(J) = 0) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1) then P (parity(J) = 0 | ω) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1 | ω).
Here parity can be defined arbitrarily by either treating ai or bi as a 1 bit.
In the case of FRAPP, we also see that one of its guarantees is the protection of parity. This seems to
be a general property of privacy definitions that are based on algorithms that operate on individual tuples
independently.
5.3 Additive Noise
In this section, we analyze a different class of algorithms – those that add noise to their inputs. In the
cases we study, the input domain is I = {. . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . } and the algorithm being analyzed adds an
integer-valued random variable to its input. In the first case that we study (Section 5.3.1), the algorithm
adds a random variable of the form Z = X−Y where X and Y have the negative binomial distribution; this
includes the geometric mechanism [19] as a special case. In the second case (Section 5.3.2), the algorithm
adds a random variable from a Skellam distribution [38], which has the form Z = X − Y where X and Y
have Poisson distributions.
5.3.1 Differenced Negative Binomial Mechanism
The Geometric(p) distribution is a probability distribution over nonnegative integers k with mass function
pk(1−p). The negative binomial distribution, NB(p, r), is a probability distribution over nonnegative integers
k with mass function
(
k+r−1
k
)
pk(1−p)r. It is well-known (and easy to show) that an NB(p, r) random variable
has the same distribution as the sum of r independent Geometric(p) random variables. In order to get a
distribution over the entire set of integers, we can use the difference of two independent NB(p, r) random
variables. This leads to the following noise addition algorithm:
Definition 5.13. (Differenced Negative Binomial Mechanism MDNB(p,r)). Define MDNB(p,r) to be the
algorithm that adds X − Y to its input, where X and Y are two independent random variables having the
negative binomial distribution with parameters p and r. We call MDNB(p,r) the differenced negative binomial
mechanism.
The relationship to the geometric mechanism [19], which adds a random integer k with distribution
1−p
1+pp
|k|, is captured in the following lemma:
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Lemma 5.14. MDNB(p,1), the differenced negative binomial mechanism with r = 1, is the geometric mech-
anism.
Proof. See Appendix J.
The following theorem gives us the row cone of the differenced negative binomial mechanism.
Theorem 5.15. A bounded row vector ~x = (. . . , x−2, x−1, x0, x1, x2, . . . ) belongs to rowcone({MDNB(p,r)})
if for all integers k,
∀k :
r∑
j=−r
(−1)jfB
(
j;
p
1 + p
, r
)
xk+j ≥ 0
where p and r are the parameters of the differenced negative binomial distribution and fB(·; p/(1+p), r) is the
probability mass function of the difference of two independent binomial (not negative binomial) distributions
whose parameters are p/(1 + p) (success probability) and r (number of trials).
Proof. See Appendix K.
To interpret Theorem 5.15 note that (1) the coefficients of the linear inequality are given by the distri-
bution of the difference of two binomials, (2) the coefficients alternate in signs, and (3) for each integer k,
the corresponding linear inequality has the coefficients shifted over by k spots.
One interpretation of Theorem 5.15, therefore, is that if an attacker has managed to rule out all possible
inputs except k − r, k − r + 1, . . . , k + r − 1, k + r and has a prior on these inputs that corresponds to
the difference of two binomials (centered at k) then after seeing the sanitized output of MDNB(p,r), the
attacker will believe that the set of possible inputs {. . . , k − 3, k − 1, k + 1, . . . } is not more likely than
{. . . , k− 4, k− 2, k, k+ 2, . . . }. Again we see a notion of protection of parity but for a smaller set of possible
inputs, and note that initially this looks like a one-sided guarantee – the posterior probability of odd offsets
from k does not increase beyond the posterior probability of the even offsets from k.
However, what is surprising to us is that this kind of guarantee has many strong implications. To illustrate
this point, consider MDNB(p,1) which is equivalent to the geometric mechanism. The linear inequalities in
Theorem 5.15 then simplify (after some simple manipulations) to −xk−1+(p+1/p)xk−xk+1 ≥ 0 which means
that a mechanism must satisfy for all k, −P [M(k− 1) = ω] + (p+ 1/p)P [M(k) = ω]−P [M(k+ 1) = ω] ≥ 0.
Using these inequalities in the following telescoping sum, we see that they imply the familiar -differential
privacy constraints with  = − log p (so e = 1/p)).
p−1P [M(k) = ω]− P [M(k − 1) = ω]
=
∞∑
j=0
pj (−P [M(k − 1 + j) = ω] + (p+ 1/p)P [M(k + j) = ω]− P [M(k + 1 + j) = ω]) ≥ 0
p−1P [M(k) = ω]− P [M(k + 1) = ω]
=
∞∑
j=0
pj (−P [M(k − 1− j) = ω] + (p+ 1/p)P [M(k − j) = ω]− P [M(k + 1− j) = ω]) ≥ 0
The take-home message, we believe, from this example is that protections on parity, even one-sided
protections can be very powerful (for example, we saw how the one-sided protections in Theorem 5.15 can
imply the two-sided protections in differential privacy). Thus an interesting direction for future work is to
develop methods for analyzing how different guarantees relate to each other; for example, if we protect a
fact X, then what else do we end up protecting?
5.3.2 Skellam Noise
In the previous section, we saw how (differenced) negative binomial noise was related to protections against
attackers with (differenced) binomial priors, thus exhibiting a dual relationship between the binomial and
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negative binomial distributions. In this section, we study noise distributed according to the Skellam distri-
bution [38], which turns out to be its own dual.
The Poisson(λ) distribution is a probability distribution over nonnegative integers k with distribution
e−λ λ
k
k! . A random variable Z has the Skellam(λ1, λ2) distribution if it is equal to the difference X −
Y of two independent random variables X and Y having the Poisson(λ1) and Poisson(λ2) distributions,
respectively[38].
Theorem 5.16. Let the input domain I = {. . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . } be the set of integers. Let Mskell(λ1, λ2)
be the algorithm that adds to its input a random integer k with the Skellam(λ1, λ2) distribution and let
fZ(·;λ1, λ2) be the probability mass function of the Skellam(λ1, λ2) distribution. A bounded row vector ~x =
(. . . , x−2, x−1, x0, x1, x2, . . . ) belongs to rowcone({Mskell(λ1, λ2)}) if for all integers k,
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)jfZ(j;λ1, λ2)xk+j ≥ 0
Proof. See Appendix I.
As before, we see that Skellam noise protects parity if the attacker uses a Skellam prior that is shifted9
by k so that the posterior probability of the set {. . . , k − 3, k − 1, k + 1, k + 3, . . . } cannot be higher than
that of the set {. . . , k − 2, k, k + 2, . . . }.
5.3.3 Other distributions.
When the input domain is the set of integers there is a general technique for deriving the row cone corre-
sponding to an algorithm that adds integer-valued noise to its inputs. If the noise distribution has probability
mass function f , then the matrix representation of the noise-addition algorithm is a matrix M (with rows
and columns indexed by integers) whose (i, j) entry is f(i − j). One can take the Fourier series transform
(characteristic function) f̂(t) =
∑∞
`=−∞ f(`)e
i`t. Let g be the inverse transform of 1/f̂(t), if it exists. Then
the inverse of the matrix M is a matrix whose (i, j) entries are g(i − j). In combination with Theorem
5.1, this allows one to derive the linear constraints defining the row cone. We used this approach to derive
the results of Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 and the proof of Theorem 5.15 provides a formal justification for this
technique.
5.4 Relaxing Privacy Definitions
As we saw in Section 5.1, a privacy definition Priv may end up protecting more than we want. In such cases,
we can manipulate the rowcone(Priv) to relax it. This will give us a new row cone R and will allow us to
create a privacy definition Priv′ of the form: M ∈ Priv′ if and only if every row of the matrix representation
of M belongs to R.
To relax rowcone(Priv), we will replace the linear constraints that define it with weaker linear constraints.
An appropriate tool is Fourier-Motzkin elimination [8], which will produce a new set of linear constraints
which are implied by the old constraints. The new constraints will have fewer variables per constraint.
We illustrate this technique by continuing Example 5.6 (randomized response on databases with k = 2
tuples). Rewriting equations 4 and 7 to isolate x01 and setting α = p/(1− p), we get
αx00 + x11/α− x10 ≥ x01 ≥ αx00 + αx11 − α2x10
⇒ x11 ≤ αx10
Recalling that x11 is shorthand for P (M(11) = ω) and x10 is shorthand for P (M(10) = ω) we see that
Fourier-Motzkin elimination on the original constraints yielded one of the constraints of (ln p1−p )-differential
privacy. Applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination on the other equations in Example 5.6 yields the rest of the
differential privacy constraints. Thus we see that differential privacy is a natural relaxation of randomized
response.
9i.e. the prior has the distribution of Z + k where k is a constant and Z has the Skellam distribution.
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6 Conclusions
We view privacy as a type of theory of information where the goal is to study how different algorithms
filter out certain pieces of information. To this end we proposed the first (to the best of our knowledge)
framework for extracting semantic guarantees from privacy definitions. The framework depends on the
concepts of consistent normal form CNF(Priv) and rowcone(Priv). The consistent normal form corresponds
to an explicit set of trusted algorithms and the row cone corresponds to the type of information that is
always protected by an output of an algorithm belonging to a given privacy definition. The usefulness of
these concepts comes from their geometric nature and relations to linear algebra and convex geometry.
There are many important directions for future work. These include extracting semantic guarantees that
fail with a small probability, such as various probabilistic relaxations of differential privacy (e.g., [33, 5]). In
contrast, the row cone is only useful for finding guarantees that always hold. It is also important to study
formal ways of relaxing/strengthening privacy definitions and exploring the relationships between different
types of semantic guarantees.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.4
Theorem A.1. (Restatement and proof of Theorem 4.4). Given a privacy definition Priv, its consistent
normal form CNF(Priv) is equivalent to the following.
1. Define Priv(1) to be the set of all (deterministic and randomized algorithms) of the form A◦M, where
M ∈ Priv, range(M) ⊆ domain(A), and the random bits of A and M are independent of each other.
2. For any positive integer n, finite sequence M1, . . . ,Mn and probability vector ~p = (p1, . . . , pn), use
the notation choice~p(M1, . . . ,Mn) to represent the algorithm that runs Mi with probability pi. Define
Priv(2) to be the set of all algorithms of the form choice~p(M1, . . . ,Mn) where n is a positive integer,
M1, . . . ,Mn ∈ Priv(1), and ~p is a probability vector.
3. Set CNF(Priv) = Priv(2).
Proof. We need to show that Priv(2) satisfies Axioms 4.1 and 4.2 consistent and that any other privacy
definition that satisfies both axioms and contains Priv must also contain Priv(2).
By construction, Priv(2) satisfies Axiom 4.2 (convexity). To show that Priv(2) satisfies Axiom 4.1 (post-
processing), choose any M ∈ Priv(2) and a postprocessing algorithm A. By construction of Priv(2), there
exists an integer m, a sequence of algorithms M
(1)
1 , . . . ,M
(1)
m with each M
(1)
i ∈ Priv(1), and a probabil-
ity vector ~p = (p1, . . . , pm) such that M = choice
p(M
(1)
1 , . . . ,M
(1)
m ). It is easy to check that A◦M =
choicep(A◦M(1)1 , . . . ,A◦M(1)m ). By construction of Priv(1), A◦M(1)i ∈ Priv(1) because M(1)i ∈ Priv(1).
Therefore, by construction of Priv(2), A◦M ∈ Priv(2) and so Priv(2) satisfies Axiom 4.1 (post-processing).
Now let Priv′ be some privacy definition containing Priv and satisfying both axioms. By Axiom 4.1
(post-processing), Priv(1) ⊆ Priv′. By Axiom 4.2 (convexity) it follows that Priv(2) ⊆ Priv′. Therefore
CNF(Priv) = Priv(2) ⊆ Priv′.
B Proof of Corollary 4.5
Corollary B.1. (Restatement of Corollary 4.5).
If Priv = {M} consists of just one algorithm, CNF(Priv) is the set of all algorithms of the form A◦M,
where range(M) ⊆ domain(A) and the random bits in A and M are independent of each other.
Proof. We use the notation defined in Theorem 4.4. The corollary follows easily from process described in
Theorem 4.4 and the fact that
choice~p(A1 ◦M, . . . ,An ◦M) =
(
choice~p(A1, . . . ,An)
)
◦M
so that the process of computing CNF(Priv) has stopped after the first step.
C Proof of Theorem 4.7
Theorem C.1. (Restatement and proof of Theorem 4.7). rowcone(Priv) is a convex cone.
Proof. Choose any ~v = (v1, v2, . . . ) ∈ rowcone(Priv). Then by definition c~v ∈ rowcone(Priv) for any c ≥ 0.
This takes care of the cone property so that we only need to show that rowcone(Priv) is a convex set.
Choose any vectors ~x = (x1, x2, . . . ) ∈ rowcone(Priv), ~y = (y1, y2, . . . ) ∈ rowcone(Priv), and number t
such that 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. We show that t~x+ (1− t)~y ∈ rowcone(Priv). If either ~x = ~0 or ~y = ~0 then we are done
by the cone property we just proved. Otherwise, by definition of row cone, there exist constants c1, c2 > 0,
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algorithms M1,M2 ∈ CNF(Priv), and sanitized outputs ω1 ∈ range(M1), ω2 ∈ range(M2) such that ~x/c1 is
a row of the matrix representation of M1 and ~y/c2 is a row of the matrix representation of M2:
~x =
(
c1P [M1(D1) = ω1], c1P [M1(D2) = ω1], . . .
)
~y =
(
c2P [M2(D1) = ω2], c2P [M2(D2) = ω2], . . .
)
Let A1 be the algorithm that outputs ω if its input is ω1 and ω′ otherwise. Similarly, let A2 be the algorithm
that outputs ω if its input is ω2 and ω
′ otherwise. Define M′1 ≡ A1 ◦M1 and M′2 ≡ A2 ◦M2. Then by
Theorem 4.4 (and the post-processing Axiom 4.1), M′1,M
′
2 ∈ CNF(Priv) and
~x =
(
c1P [M
′
1(D1) = ω], c1P [M
′
1(D2) = ω], . . .
)
~y =
(
c2P [M
′
2(D1) = ω], c2P [M
′
2(D2) = ω], . . .
)
Now consider the algorithm M∗ which runs M′1 with probability
tc1
tc1+(1−t)c2 and runs M
′
2 with probability
(1−t)c2
tc1+(1−t)c2 . By Theorem 4.4, M
∗ ∈ CNF(Priv). Then for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,
P (M∗(Di) = ω) =
tc1P (M
′
1(Di) = ω) + (1− t)c2P (M′2(Di) = ω)
tc1 + (1− t)c2
=
txi + (1− t)yi
tc1 + (1− t)c2
Thus the vector t~x+(1−t)~ytc1+(1−t)c2 is the row vector corresponding to ω of the matrix representation of M
∗ and is
therefore in rowcone(Priv). Multiplying by the nonnegative constant tc1+(1−t)c2, we get that t~x+(1−t)~y ∈
rowcone(Priv) and so rowcone(Priv) is convex.
D Proof of Theorem 5.1
Theorem D.1. (Restatement and proof of Theorem 5.1). Let I be a finite or countably infinite set of
possible datasets. Let M∗ be an algorithm with domain(M∗) = I. Let M∗ be the matrix representation of
M∗ (Definition 2.1). If (M∗)−1 exists and the L1 norm of each column of (M∗)−1 is bounded by a constant
C then
(1) A bounded row vector ~x ∈ rowcone({M∗}) if and only if ~x ·m ≥ 0 for every column m of (M∗)−1.
(2) An algorithm M, with matrix representation M , belongs to CNF({M∗}) if and only if the matrix
M(M∗)−1 contains no negative entries.
(3) An algorithm M, with matrix representation M , belongs to CNF({M∗}) if and only if every row of M
belongs to rowcone({M∗}).
Proof. We first prove (1). If ~x is the 0 vector then this is clearly true. Thus assume ~x 6= ~0. If ~x ∈
rowcone({M∗}) then by definition of the row cone and by Corollary 4.5, ~x = ~yM∗ where ~y is a bounded
row vector and has nonnegative components. Then ~x(M∗)−1 = ~yM∗(M∗)−1 = ~y and so ~x ·m ≥ 0 for every
column m of (M∗)−1.
For the other direction, we must construct an algorithm A with matrix representation A such that for
some c > 0, c~x is a row of AM∗ (by definition of row cone and Corollary 4.5). Thus, by hypothesis, suppose
~x ·m ≥ 0 for each column vector m of (M∗)−1 and consider the row vector ~y = ~x(M∗)−1 which therefore
has nonnegative entries. Since ~x is bounded and ||m||1 ≤ C for each column vector m of (M∗)−1 then
|~x ·m| ≤ ||~x||∞||m||1 ≤ ||~x||∞C (by Ho¨lder’s Inequality [35]) so that ~y is bounded. Choose a c so that c~y is
bounded by 1. Consider the algorithm A that has a matrix representation A with two rows, the first row
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being c~y and the second row being 1−c~y (A is an algorithm since c~y and 1−c~y have nonnegative components
and the column sums of A are clearly 1). A is the desired algorithm since c~x is a row of AM∗.
To prove (2) and (3), note that if an algorithm has matrix representation M , then M(M∗)−1 contains
all the dot products between rows of M and columns of (M∗)−1. Therefore, the entries of M(M∗)−1 are
nonnegative if and only if every row of M is in the rowcone({M∗}) (this follows directly from the first part
of the theorem). Thus (2) and (3) are equivalent and therefore we only need to prove (2).
To prove (2), first note the trivial direction. If M ∈ CNF({M∗}) then by definition every row of M
is in the row cone (and so by (1) all entries of M(M∗)−1 are nonnegative). For the other direction, let
A = M(M∗)−1 (which has no negative entries by hypothesis). If we can show that the column sums of A
are all 1 then, since A contains no negative entries, A would be a column stochastic matrix and therefore
it would be the matrix representation of some algorithm A. From this it would follow that AM∗ = M and
therefore A◦M∗ = M (in which case M ∈ CNF(M∗) by Theorem 4.4).
So all we need to do is to prove that the column sums of A are all 1. Let ~1 be a column vector whose
components are all 1. Then since M is a matrix representation of an algorithm (Definition 2.1), M has
column sums equal to 1, and similarly for M∗. Thus:
~1T = ~1TM∗(M∗)−1
= ~1T (M∗)−1
and therefore
~1TA = ~1TM(M∗)−1
= ~1T (M∗)−1
= ~1T
and so the column sums of A are equal to 1. This completes the proof of this theorem.
E Proof of Lemma 5.4
Lemma E.1. (Restatement and proof of Lemma 5.4). Given a privacy parameter p, define q = max(p, 1−p).
Then
• CNF({Mrr(p)}) = CNF({Mrr(q)}).
• If p = 1/2 then CNF({Mrr(p)}) consists of the set of algorithms whose outputs are statistically indepen-
dent of their inputs (i.e. those algorithms M where P [M(Di) = ω] = P [M(Dj) = ω] for all Di, Dj ∈ I
and ω ∈ range(M)), and therefore attackers learn nothing from those outputs.
Proof. Consider the algorithm Mrr(0) which always flips each bit in its input. It is easy to see that
Mrr(0) ◦Mrr(p) = Mrr(1−p) and Mrr(0) ◦Mrr(1−p) = Mrr(p). From Theorem 4.4, it follows that CNF({Mrr(p)}) =
CNF({Mrr(1−p)}) and therefore CNF({Mrr(p)}) = CNF({Mrr(q)}).
Clearly, the output of Mrr(1/2) is independent of whatever was the true input table D ∈ I. By Theorem
4.4, all algorithms in CNF({Mrr(1/2)}) have outputs independent of their inputs. For the other direction,
choose any algorithm M whose outputs are statistically independent of their inputs. Then it is easy to
see that M = M ◦Mrr(1/2); that is, M and M ◦Mrr(1/2) have the same range and P (M(Di) = ω) =
P ([M ◦Mrr(1/2)](Di) = 0) for all Di ∈ I and ω ∈ range(M). Thus M ∈ CNF({Mrr(1/2)}).
Clearly, when the output is statistically independent of the input, an attacker can learn nothing about
the input after observing the output.
F Proof of Theorem 5.5
Theorem F.1. (Restatement and proof of Theorem 5.5). Given input space I = {D1, . . . , D2k} of bit strings
of length k and a privacy parameter p > 1/2,
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• A vector ~x = (x1, . . . , x2k) ∈ rowcone({Mrr(p)}) if and only if for every bit string s of length k,
2k∑
i=1
pham(s,Di)(p− 1)k−ham(s,Di)xi ≥ 0
where ham(s,Di) is the Hamming distance between s and Di.
• An algorithm M with matrix representation M belongs to CNF({Mrr(p)}) if and only if every row of M
belongs to rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
Proof. Our strategy is to first derive the matrix representation of Mrr(p), which we denote by Mrr(p). Then
we find the inverse of Mrr(p) and apply Theorem 5.1. Accordingly, we break the proof down into 3 steps.
Step 1: Derive Mrr(p). Define B to be the matrix
B =
(
p 1− p
1− p p
)
Recall that the Kronecker product C ⊕D of an m× n matrix C and m′ × n′ matrix D is the block matrix(
c11D ... c1nD
...
. . .
...
cm1D ... cmnD
)
of dimension mm′ × nn′. An easy induction shows that the matrix representation Mrr(p)
is equal to the k-fold Kronecker product of B with itself:
Mrr(p) =
k⊗
i=1
B
The entry in row i and column j of Mrr(p) is equal to P [Mrr(P )(Dj) = Di] and a direct computation
shows that this is equal to
pham(Di,Dj)(1− p)k−ham(Di,Dj)
Step 2: Derive (Mrr(p))
−1. It is easy to check that
B−1 =
1
2p− 1
(
p −(1− p)
−(1− p) p
)
and therefore
(Mrr(p))
−1 =
k⊗
i=1
B−1
A comparison with
k⊗
i=1
B−1 shows that the we can calculate the entry in row i and column j of (Mrr(p))−1
by taking the corresponding entry of Mrr(p) and replacing every occurrence of 1− p with −(1− p) = p− 1.
Thus the entry in row i and column j of (Mrr(p))
−1 is equal to
1
(2p− 1)k p
ham(Di,Dj)(p− 1)k−ham(Di,Dj)
Therefore each column of (Mrr(p))
−1 has the form:
1
(2p− 1)k

pham(s,D1)(p− 1)k−ham(s,D1)
pham(s,D2)(p− 1)k−ham(s,D2)
...
pham(s,D2k )(p− 1)k−ham(s,D2k )

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Step 3: Now we apply Theorem 5.1 and observe that if m(i) is the ith column of (Mrr(p))
−1, then, since
p > 1/2 and 2p− 1 > 0, the condition ~x ·m(i) is equal to the condition
2k∑
j=1
pham(s,Dj)(p− 1)k−ham(s,Dj)xj ≥ 0
where s = Di.
G Proof of Theorem 5.7
Theorem G.1. (Restatement and proof of Theorem 5.7). Let p be a privacy parameter and let I =
D1, . . . , D2k . Let M be an algorithm that has a matrix representation whose every row belongs to the row
cone of randomized response. If the attacker believes that the bits in the data are independent and bit i is
equal to 1 with probability qi, then M protects the parity of any subset of bits that have prior probability ≥ p
or ≤ 1− p. That is, for any subset {`1, . . . , `m} of bits of the input data such that q`j ≥ p ∨ g`j ≤ 1− p for
j = 1, . . . ,m, the following holds:
• If P (parity(J) = 0) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1) then P (parity(J) = 0 | M(data)) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1 | M(data))
• If P (parity(J) = 1) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0) then P (parity(J) = 1 | M(data)) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0 | M(data))
Furthermore, an algorithm M can only provide these guarantees if every row of its matrix representation
belongs to rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
Proof. We break this proof up into a series of steps. We first reformulate the statements to make them easier
to analyze mathematically, then we specialize to the case where J = {1, . . . , k} is the set of all bits in the
database. We then show that every M whose rows (in the corresponding matrix representation) belong to
rowcone(Mrr(p)) has these semantic guarantees. We then show that only those M provide these semantic
guarantees. Finally we show that those results imply that the theorem holds for all J whose bits have prior
probability ≥ p or ≤ 1− p.
Step 1: Problem reformulation and specialization to the case when J = {1, . . . , k}. Assume J = {1, . . . , k}
so that for all bits j, either qj ≥ p or qj ≤ 1− p.
First, Lemma 5.4 allows us to assume that the privacy parameter p > 1/2 without any loss of generality:
the case of p = 1/2 is trivial since the output provides no information about the input so that parity is
preserved; in the case of p < 1/2, the row cone and CNF are unchanged if we replace p with 1− p.
Second, we need a few results about parity. An easy induction shows that:
P (parity(data) = 1) =
1−
k∏
j=1
(1− 2qj)
2
P (parity(data) = 0) =
1 +
k∏
j=1
(1− 2qj)
2
in particular, if all of the qj 6= 1/2 then P (parity(data) = 1) 6= P (parity(data) = 0) so that one parity has
higher prior probability than the other.
When J is the set of all k bits, then for all qj , qj 6= 1/2 and so the parities cannot be equally likely a priori,
the statement about protection of parity can be rephrased as P (parity(data) = 0) − P (parity(data) = 1)
and P (parity(data) = 0 | M(data)) − P (parity(data) = 1 | M(data)) have the same sign or the posterior
probabilities of parity are the same. Equivalently,
0 ≤
(
P [parity(data) = 0]− P [parity(data) = 1]
)
×
(
P [parity(data) = 0 | M(data)]− P [parity(data) = 1 | M(data)]
)
(10)
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Now, it is easy to see that
P (parity(data) = 0)− P (parity(data) = 1)
=
 k⊗
j=1
(−qj , 1− qj)
 ·
 k⊗
j=1
(1, 1)

=
k∏
j=1
[
(−qj , 1− qj) · (1, 1)
]
(11)
and
P [parity(data) = 0 | M(data)]− P [parity(data) = 1 | M(data)]
= α
 k⊗
j=1
(−qj , 1− qj)
 · ~x (12)
where α is a positive normalizing constant and ~x is a vector of the matrix representation of M. So, by
Equations 10, 11, and 12, the statement about protecting parity is equivalent to
∀~x ∈ rowcone({Mrr(p)}) : 0 ≤
 k∏
j=1
[
(−qj , 1− qj) · (1, 1)
] ∗
 k⊗
j=1
(−qj , 1− qj)
 · ~x
 (13)
Step 2: Show that if for all j, qj ≥ p ∨ qj ≤ 1− p then the constraints in Equation 13 hold (i.e. the most
likely parity a priori is the most likely parity a posteriori).
It follows from Corollary 4.5 that every M ∈ CNF({Mrr(p)}) has the form A◦Mrr(p) and so, by Theorem
5.1, ~x is a row from the matrix representation of an M ∈ CNF({Mrr(p)}) if and only if ~x ∈ rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
This means that ever such ~x is a nonnegative linear combination of rows of the randomized response algorithm
Mrr(p). Thus it suffices to show that
0 ≤
 k∏
j=1
[
(−qj , 1− qj) · (1, 1)
] ∗
 k⊗
j=1
(−qj , 1− qj)
 · ~m
 (14)
for each vector ~m in Mrr(p) (the matrix representation of Mrr(p)). It is easy to check that
Mrr(p) =
k⊗
i=1
(
p 1− p
1− p p
)
and so every vector ~m that is a row of Mrr(p) has the form
k⊗
i=1
vi where vi = (p, 1− p) or (1− p, p). Thus
right hand side of Equation 14 has the form:
k∏
j=1
[(
(−qj , 1− qj) · (1, 1)
)
∗
(
(−qj , 1− qj) · vi
)]
(15)
where vi = (p, 1− p) or (1− p, p). Each term in this product is either
(1− 2qj) ∗ [(1− p)(1− qj)− qjp] = (1− 2qj)[1− p− qj ]
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or
(1− 2qj) ∗ [p(1− qj)− qj(1− p)] = (1− 2qj)[p− qj ]
Recalling that we had assumed p > 1/2 without any loss of generality, both of these terms are nonnegative
if qj ≥ p > 1/2 and they are also nonnegative when qi ≤ (1 − p) < 1/2. Thus the product in Equation 15
is nonnegative from which it follows that the conditions in Equation 14 and 13 are satisfied which implies
Equation 10 is satisfied, which proves half of the theorem when restricted to the special case of J = {1, . . . , k}.
Step 3: Show that if M is a mechanism that protects parity whenever qj ≥ p ∨ qj ≤ 1− p for i = 1, . . . , k
then every row ~x in its matrix representation belongs to rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
We actually prove a more general statement: if M is a mechanism that protects parity whenever qj =
p ∨ qj = 1− p for i = 1, . . . , k then every row ~x in its matrix representation belongs to rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
Recalling the argument leading up to Equation 13 in Step 2 (where we reformulated the problem into a
statement that is more amenable to mathematical manipulation), we need to show that if
0 ≤
 k∏
j=1
[
(−qj , 1− qj) · (1, 1)
] ∗
 k⊗
j=1
(−qj , 1− qj)
 · ~x
 (16)
whenever qj = p or qj = 1− p then ~x ∈ rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
Define the function:
sign(α) =

−1 if α < 0
0 if α = 0
1 if α > 0
Simplifying Equation 16 (by computing the dot product in the first term, looking just at the sign of that
dot product, and then combining both terms), our goal is to show that if
0 ≤
 k⊗
j=1
(−qj , 1− qj) ∗ sign(1− 2qj)
 · ~x
 (17)
whenever qj = p or qj = 1− p then ~x ∈ rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
Now, when qj = p (and recalling that we have assumed p > 1/2 with no loss of generality in Step 1),
then
(−qj , 1− qj) ∗ sign(1− 2qj) = (p, − (1− p))
and when qj = 1− p then
(−qj , 1− qj) ∗ sign(1− 2qj) = (−(1− p), p)
Thus asserting that Equation 17 holds whenever qj equals p or 1 − p is the same as asserting that the
vector:
~xT
k⊕
i=1
1
2p− 1
(
p −(1− p)
−(1− p) p
)
(18)
has no negative components. However, the randomized response algorithm Mrr(p) has a matrix representa-
tion Mrr(p) whose inverse (which we also derived in the proof of Theorem 5.5) is
(Mrr(p))
−1 =
k⊕
i=1
1
2p− 1
(
p −(1− p)
−(1− p) p
)
Thus the condition that the vector in Equation 18 has no negative entries means that ~xT (Mrr(p))
−1 has
no negative entries and so the dot product of ~x with any column of (Mrr(p))
−1 is nonnegative. By Theorem
5.5, this means that ~x ∈ rowcone({Mrr(p)}).
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This concludes the proof for the entire theorem specialized to the case where J = {1, . . . , k}. In the next
step, we generalize this to arbitrary J .
Step 4: Now let J = {`1, . . . , `m}. First consider an “extreme” attacker whose prior beliefs qj are such that
qj = 0 or qj = 1 whenever j /∈ J . It follows from the previous steps that such an attacker would not change
his mind about the parity of the whole dataset. Since the attacker is completely sure about the values of
bits outside of J , this means that after seeing a sanitized output ω, the attacker will not change his mind
about the parity of the bits in J .
Now, note that showing
• If P (parity(J) = 0) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1) then
P (parity(J) = 0 | M(data) = ω) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1 | M(data) = ω)
• If P (parity(J) = 1) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0) then
P (parity(J) = 1 | M(data) = ω) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0 | M(data) = ω)
is equivalent to showing
• If P (parity(J) = 0) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1) then
P (parity(J) = 0 ∧ M(data)) ≥ P (parity(J) = 1 ∧ M(data))
• If P (parity(J) = 1) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0) then
P (parity(J) = 1 ∧ M(data) = ω) ≥ P (parity(J) = 0 ∧ M(data) = ω)
since we just multiply the equations on both sides of the inequalities by the positive number P (M(data) = ω).
Now consider an attacker Bob such that qj ≥ p or qj ≤ 1−p whenever j ∈ J and there are no restrictions
on qj for j /∈ J . There is a corresponding set of 2k−|J| “extreme” attackers for whom P (bit j = 1) = qj for
j ∈ J and P (bit j = 1) ∈ {0, 1} otherwise.
Bob’s vector of prior probabilities over possible datasets
(P [data = D1], P [data = D2], . . . )
is a convex combination of the corresponding vectors for the extreme attackers. and thus Bob’s joint distri-
butions:
P (parity(J) = 1 ∧ M(data) = ω)
and
P (parity(J) = 0 ∧ M(data) = ω)
are convex combinations of the corresponding posteriors for the extreme attackers, and the coefficients of
this convex combination are the same.
Note that Bob and all of the extreme attackers have the same prior on the parity of J . However, we
have shown that the extreme attackers will not change their minds about the parity of J . Therefore if they
believe P (parity(J) = 1 ∧ M(data) = ω) is larger than the corresponding probability for even parity, then
Bob will have the same belief. If the extreme attackers believe, after seeing the sanitized output ω, that even
parity is more likely, then so will Bob. Thus Bob will not change his belief about the parity of the input
dataset.
H Proof of Lemma 5.12
Lemma H.1. (Restatement and proof of Lemma 5.12). Let p = γγ+1 . Then K˜p is an approximation cone
for γ-FRAPP.
Proof. Clearly K˜p is a closed convex cone. Thus we just need to prove that rowcone(γ-FRAPP) ⊆ K˜p.
28
Choose any MQ ∈ γ-FRAPP, with matrix representation MQ. Clearly
MQ =
k⊗
i=1
Q
and Q satisfies the constraints
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} : Q(pei − (1− p)ej)  ~0
where ei is the i
th column vector of the N ×N identity matrix and ~a  ~b means that ~a−~b has no negative
components. It follows from the properties of the Kronecker product that
∀i1, . . . , ik, j1, . . . , jk ∈ {1, . . . , N} : MQ
(
k⊗
`=1
(pei` − (1− p)ej`)
)
 ~0 (19)
Thus each row of the matrix representation of MQ satisfies a set of linear constraints.
From Theorem 4.4, we see that CNF(γ-FRAPP) can be obtained by first creating all algorithms of the
form A◦MQ (for MQ ∈ γ-FRAPP) and then by taking the convex combination of those results (i.e. creating
algorithms that randomly choose to run one of the algorithms generated in the previous step). However, the
matrix representation of A◦MQ is equal to AMQ (where A is the matrix representation of A) and every
row in AMQ is a positive linear combination of rows in MQ. Thus every row of the matrix representation of
A◦MQ also satisfies the constraints defining K˜p. Finally, creating an algorithm A∗ that randomly choose
to run one algorithm in {A1 ◦MQ1 , . . . ,Ah ◦MQh} means that the rows in the matrix representation of A∗
is a convex combination of the rows appearing in the matrix representations of the Ai ◦MQi and so those
rows also satisfy the constraints that define K˜p. Therefore rowcone(γ-FRAPP) ⊆ K˜p.
I Proof of Theorem 5.16
Theorem I.1. ( Restatement and proof of Theorem 5.16) Let the input domain I = {. . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . }
be the set of integers. Let Mskell(λ1, λ2) be the algorithm that adds to its input a random integer k with
the Skellam(λ1, λ2) distribution and let fZ(·;λ1, λ2) be the probability mass function of the Skellam(λ1, λ2)
distribution. A bounded row vector ~x = (. . . , x−2, x−1, x0, x1, x2, . . . ) belongs to rowcone({Mskell(λ1, λ2)}) if
for all integers k,
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)jfZ(j;λ1, λ2)xk+j ≥ 0
Proof. For integers k, define the functions
fX(k) =
{
e−λ1 λ
k
1
k! if k ≥ 0
0 if k < 0
fY (k) =
{
e−λ2 λ
−k
2
(−k)! if k ≤ 0
0 if k > 0
Note that fX is the probability mass function for a Poisson(λ1) random variable X while fY is the probability
mass function of the negative of a Poisson(λ2) random variable Y .
With this notation, the Skellam distribution is the distribution of the sum X+Y . Therefore its probability
mass function satisfies the following relation
fZ(k;λ1, λ2) =
∞∑
j=−∞
fX(k − j)fY (j) = (fX ? fY )(k)
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where fX ? fY is the convolution operation.
Now for each integer k define
gX(k) = (−1)kfX(k)
gY (k) = (−1)kfY (k)
gZ(k) = (gX ? gY )(k)
=
∞∑
j=−∞
gX(k − j)gY (j)
=
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)k−jfX(k − j)(−1)jfY (j)
= (−1)k
∞∑
j=−∞
fX(k − j)fY (j)
= (−1)kfZ(k;λ1, λ2)
We will need the following calculations:
(gX ? fX)(k) =
∞∑
j=−∞
gX(k − j)fX(j)
=
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)k−jfX(k − j)fX(j)
=
k∑
j=0
(−1)k−jfX(k − j)fX(j)
(since fX is 0 for negative integers also note the summation is 0 if j > k)
= 1{k≥0}e−2λ1
k∑
j=0
(−λ1)k−j
(k − j)!
λj1
j!
= 1{k≥0}
e−2λ1
k!
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
(−λ1)k−jλj1
= 1{k≥0}
e−2λ1
k!
(λ1 − λ1)k
=
{
e−2λ1 if k = 0
0 otherwise
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Similarly
(gY ? fY )(k) =
∞∑
j=−∞
gY (k − j)fY (j)
=
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)k−jfY (k − j)fY (j)
=
0∑
j=k
(−1)k−jfY (k − j)fY (j)
(since fY is 0 for positive integers also note the summation is 0 if k > j)
= 1{k≤0}e−2λ2
0∑
j=k
(−λ2)−(k−j)
(−(k − j))!
λ−j2
(−j)!
= 1{k≤0}e−2λ2
−k∑
j=0
(−λ2)(−k)−j
[(−k)− j]!
λj2
j!
(replacing the dummy index j with −j)
= 1{k≤0}
e−2λ2
(−k)!
−k∑
j=0
(
(−k)
j
)
(−λ2)(−k)−jλj2
= 1{k≤0}
e−2λ2
(−k)! (λ2 − λ2)
(−k)
=
{
e−2λ2 if k = 0
0 otherwise
From these calculations we can conclude that
(gZ ? fZ(·;λ1, λ2))(k) = ((gX ? gY ) ? (fX ? fY ))(k)
= ((gX ? fX) ? (gY ? fY ))(k)
(since convolutions are commutative and associative)
=
{
e−2(λ1+λ2) if k = 0
0 otherwise
These convolution calculations show that the matrices M (f) and M (g), whose rows and columns are indexed
by the integers and which are defined below, are inverses of each other.
M
(f)
(i,j) ≡ (i, j) entry of M (f)
= fZ(i− j;λ1, λ2)
M
(g)
(i,j) ≡ (i, j) entry of M (g)
= e2(λ1+λ2)gZ(i− j)
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To see that they are inverses, note that the dot product between row r of M (f) and column c of M (g) is
∞∑
j=−∞
M
(f)
(r,j)M
(g)
(j,c) =
∞∑
j=−∞
fZ(r − j;λ1, λ2)e2(λ1+λ2)gZ(j − c)
=
∞∑
j=−∞
fZ(r − c− j;λ1, λ2)e2(λ1+λ2)gZ(j)
= e2(λ1+λ2)(fZ(·;λ1, λ2) ? gZ)(r − c)
= e2(λ1+λ2)(gZ ? fZ(·;λ1, λ2))(r − c)
=
{
1 if r = c
0 otherwise
Now, clearly M (f) is the matrix representation of Mskell(λ1, λ2) so that we can again use Theorem 5.1 and
the observation that gZ(k) = (−1)kfZ(k;λ1, λ2) so that column c of M (g) = (M (f))−1 is the column vector
whose entry j is (−1)j−cfZ(j − c;λ1, λ2).
Note that the columns of M (g) have bounded L1 norm since the absolute value of the entries in any
column are proportional to the probabilities given by the Skellam distribution.
The proof is completed by the observation that for any ~x = (. . . , x−2, x−1, x0, x1, x2, . . . ),
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)j−cfZ(j − c;λ1, λ2)xj =
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)jfZ(j;λ1, λ2)xj+c
J Proof of Lemma 5.14
Lemma J.1. (Proof and restatement of Lemma 5.14). MDNB(p,1), the differenced negative binomial mech-
anism with r = 1, is the geometric mechanism.
Proof. We need to show that the difference between two independent Geometric(p) distributions has the
probability mass function f(k) = 1−p1+pp
|k|.
Let X and Y be independent Geometric(p) random variables and let Z = X − Y . Then
P (Z = k) =

∞∑
j=0
P (X = j + k)P (Y = j) if k ≥ 0
∞∑
i=0
P (X = j)P (Y = j + |k|) if k < 0
Combining both cases, we get
P (Z = k) =
∞∑
j=0
(1− p)pj+|k|(1− p)pj
= (1− p)2p|k|
∞∑
j=0
(p2)j
= (1− p)2p|k| 1
1− p2
= (1− p)2p|k| 1
(1− p)(1 + p)
=
1− p
1 + p
p|k|
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K Proof of Theorem 5.15
We first need an intermediate result.
Lemma K.1. Let X and Y be independent random variables with the Binomial( p1+p , r) distribution (where
p/(1 + p) is the success probability and r is the number of trials). Let Z = X − Y and let fB
(
k; pp+1 , r
)
=
P (Z = k) for integers k = −r, . . . , 0, . . . r. Define the function h as h(k) = (−1)kfB
(
k; pp+1 , r
)
. The Fourier
series transform ĥ of h (defined as ĥ(t) =
∑∞
`=−∞ h(`)e
i`t) is equal to
ĥ(t) =
1
(1 + p)2r
(1− peit)r(1− pe−it)r
Proof. Define the random variable Y ′ = −Y . Then X + Y ′ = Z. Thus
ĥ(t) =
∞∑
`=−∞
h(`)ei`t
=
∞∑
`=−∞
(−1)`fB
(
`;
p
p+ 1
, r
)
ei`t
=
∞∑
`=−∞
(−1)`ei`tP (Z = `)
=
∞∑
`=−∞
ei`t(−1)`
∞∑
j=−∞
P (X = `− j)P (Y ′ = j)
=
∞∑
`=−∞
ei`t
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)`−jP (X = `− j)(−1)jP (Y ′ = j)
=
∞∑
`=−∞
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)`−jei(`−j)tP (X = `− j)(−1)jeijtP (Y ′ = j)
=
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)jeijtP (Y ′ = j)
∞∑
`=−∞
(−1)`−jei(`−j)tP (X = `− j)
33
Now,
∞∑
`=−∞
(−1)`−jei(`−j)tP (X = `− j)
=
∞∑
`=−∞
(−1)`ei`tP (X = `)
=
r∑
`=0
(−1)`ei`tP (X = `)
(Since X can only be 0, . . . , r)
=
r∑
`=0
(−1)`ei`t
(
r
`
)(
p
1 + p
)`(
1
1 + p
)r−`
=
1
(1 + p)r
r∑
`=0
(−1)`ei`t
(
r
`
)
p`
=
1
(1 + p)r
r∑
`=0
(
r
`
)
(−peit)`
=
1
(1 + p)r
(1− peit)r by the Binomial theorem
Thus continuing our previous calculation,
ĥ(t) =
∞∑
j=−∞
(−1)jeijtP (Y ′ = j) 1
(1 + p)r
(1− peit)r
=
0∑
j=−r
(−1)jeijtP (Y ′ = j) 1
(1 + p)r
(1− peit)r
(since Y ′ can only be −r, . . . , 0)
=
0∑
j=−r
(−1)jeijtP (Y = −j) 1
(1 + p)r
(1− peit)r
(since Y ′ = −Y )
=
r∑
j=0
(−1)je−ijtP (Y = j) 1
(1 + p)r
(1− peit)r
Now, similar to what we did before, we can derive that
r∑
j=0
(−1)je−ijtP (Y = j) = 1(1+p)r (1 − pe−it)r and
therefore
ĥ(t) =
1
(1 + p)2r
(1− peit)r(1− pe−it)r
Theorem K.2. (Restatement and proof of Theorem 5.15). A bounded row vector ~x = (. . . , x−2, x−1,
x0, x1, x2, . . . ) belongs to rowcone({MDNB(p,r)}) if for all integers k,
∀k :
r∑
j=−r
(−1)jfB
(
j;
p
1 + p
, r
)
xk+j ≥ 0
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where p and r are the parameters of the differenced negative binomial distribution and fB(·; p/(1+p), r) is the
probability mass function of the difference of two independent binomial (not negative binomial) distributions
whose parameters are p/(1 + p) (success probability) and r (number of trials).
Proof. For convenience, define the function h as follows:
h(j) = (−1)jfB
(
j;
p
1 + p
, r
)
Let gNB(·; p, r) be the probability distribution function for the difference of two independent NB(p, r) ran-
dom variables. Then the matrix representation MDNB(p,r) of the differenced negative binomial mechanism
MDNB(p,r) is the matrix whose rows and columns are indexed by the integers and whose entries are defined
as:
(i, j) entry of MDNB(p,r) = gNB(i− j; p, r)
By Theorem 5.1 we need to show that MDNB(p,r) is the inverse of
(1+p)2r
(1−p)2rH where H is the matrix whose
rows and columns are indexed by the integers and whose entries are defined as:
(i, j) entry of H = h(i− j) = (−1)i−jfB
(
i− j; p
1 + p
, r
)
(to see how Theorem 5.1 is applied, note that each entry of the product ~xH has the form
r∑
j=−r
(−1)jfB
(
j; p1+p , r
)
xk+j).
Now, to show that MDNB(p,r) and
(1+p)2r
(1−p)2rH are inverses of each other, we note that
(i, j) entry of
(
MDNB(p,r)H
)
=
∞∑
`=−∞
gNB(i− `; p, r)h(`− j)
=
∞∑
`′=−∞
gNB(i− j − `′; p, r)h(`′)
=
r∑
`′=−r
gNB(i− j − `′; p, r)h(`′) (20)
The last step follows from the fact that fB(`
′; p, r) and h(`′) are nonzero only when `′ is between −r and r
since fB(·; p, r) is the probability mass function of the difference of two binomial random variables (each of
which is bounded between 0 and r).
Now, Equation 20 is the definition of the convolution [35] of gNB(·; p, r) and h at the point i − j. That
is,
(gNB(·; p, r) ? h)(k) =
r∑
`′=−r
gNB(k − `′; p, r)h(`′)
and thus to show that MDNB(p,r) and
(1+p)2r
(1−p)2rH are inverses of each other, we just need to show that the
convolution of gNB(·; p, r) and h at the point 0 is equal to (1−p)
2r
(1+p)2r and that the convolution at all other
integers is 0. In other words, we want to show that for all integers k,
(gNB(·; p, r) ? h)(k) = (1− p)
2r
(1 + p)2r
δ(k) (21)
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where δ is the function that δ(0) = 1 and δ(k) = 0 for all other integers. Take the Fourier series transform
of both sides while noting two facts: (1) the Fourier series transform of δ is δ̂(t) =
∞∑
`=−∞
δ(`)ei`t ≡ 1, and (2)
the Fourier transform of a convolution is the product of the Fourier transforms [35]. Then the transformed
version of Equation 21 becomes
ĝNB(t) ĥ(t) =
(1− p)2r
(1 + p)2r
δ̂(t) ≡ (1− p)
2r
(1 + p)2r
(22)
for all real t, where ĝNB , ĥ, δ̂ are the Fourier series transforms of gNB(·; p, r), h, and δ, respectively. Once
we prove that Equation 22 is true, this implies Equation 21 is true (by the inverse Fourier transform) which
then implies that MDNB(p,r) and
(1+p)2r
(1−p)2rH are inverses of each other and this would finish the proof (by
Theorem 5.1).
Thus our goal is to prove Equation 22. The Fourier series transform (i.e. characteristic function), as a
function of t, of the NB(p, r) distribution is known to be:(
1− p
1− peit
)r
so gNB(·; p, r), being the difference of two independent negative binomial random variables, has the Fourier
series transform (as a function of t)
ĝNB(t) =
(
1− p
1− peit
)r (
1− p
1− pe−it
)r
By Lemma K.1,
ĥ(t) =
1
(1 + p)2r
(1− peit)r(1− pe−it)r
Thus Equation 22 is true and we are done.
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